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"Privilege Against Public Right:" A Reappraisal of
the Charles River Bridge Case
Robert E. Mensel*
INTRODUCTION
I am the last of the old race of Judges. I stand their solitary representa-
tive, with a pained heart, and a subdued confidence ... I am in the pre-
dicament of the last survivor.'
When the aging Justice Joseph Story wrote these wistful words
to Harriet Martineau, he was expressing much more than his
profound disagreement with the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Contracts Clause of Article I, section 10 of the United
States Constitution,2 in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.'
B.A. Wesleyan University, M.A. Rutgers University, J.D. University of
Pennsylvania. The author teaches at Widener University School of Law. Hendrik
Hartog, Jonathan Lurie, and Gregory Gelfand read and commented on earlier drafts
of this article at crucial points in its development. In addition, Mary Alice Cleve,
Dennis Corgill, Jackson Lears, James Livingston, Robert Power, Randy Steams, and
Emily Field Van Tassel offered comments and suggestions. I am deeply grateful for
their insights.
1. Letter from Justice Joseph Story to Harriet Martineau (April 7, 1837), in
2 LIFE AND LErERs OF JOSEPH STORY, 275-77 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
2. Article I, section 10, clause 1 provides as follows:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attain-
der, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant
any Title of Nobility.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
3. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) [hereinafter The Charles River Bridge Case].
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He was lamenting the passing of an era, and of a "race" to which
he did not properly belong, but with which he strongly identi-
fied." He was also lamenting the apparent failure of his own
efforts to build a conservative national law that would help pre-
serve the young republic and ensure both economic development
and economic stability by giving strong protection to vested prop-
erty rights."
Generally, historians have taken Story's concerns at face value.
They have understood the case to signal the destruction of vested
rights, which Story so feared. But they have seen that destruc-
tion as serving the interests of economic development, and as
being necessary to economic development in the nineteenth cen-
tury United States.' They have seen The Charles River Bridge
Case as a moment when the future was irrevocably changed by a
prudent choice between the irreconcilable opposites of "privilege
and creative destruction."7
This article combines close analysis of the arguments and
opinions in the case with consideration of new and pathbreaking
work in legal history, to suggest a very different interpretation of
the case.. Under this new interpretation, The Charles River
Bridge Case was important because the Court, under the new
Chief Justice, declined an opportunity to expand federal jurisdic-
The Supreme Court held under Article I, section 10, the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution, that state legislation chartering a corporation to provide some public
benefit or service, such as a bridge, turnpike, or ferry, must be construed strictly
against the corporation. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 535.
Under this rule, which favored the powers of legislatures over the rights of franchi-
sees, only those rights explicitly granted to the corporation, within the terms of the
charter, would be recognized as entitled to protection under the contracts clause. Id.
No rights would be held to have passed by implication to the corporation. Id. at
530.
As a consequence of adopting this rule of construction of public charters, the
Court ruled that the Charles River Bridge Proprietors had no vested right in the
tolls collected by travelers crossing the Charles River Bridge between Boston and
Charlestown. Id. The state was free to charter a competing bridge, a scant few
yards away, that would diminish the tolls collected by the Charles River Bridge
Proprietors, and thereby reduce and eventually destroy the value of their franchise.
Id. at 529. The Court rejected the Charles River Bridge Proprietors' argument that
their charter carried with it an implied right to the exclusive occupation of the line
of travel between Boston and Charlestown, and to the collection of tolls from all who
passed over that line of travel. Id. at 530.
4. See GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SU-
PREME COURT (1970); R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY,
STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC (1985).
5. R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New England Legal Culture, and
the Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence, 74 J. AM. HIST. 154 (1987).
6. See text accompanying notes 34-44.
7. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE
CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 155-71 (1971).
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tion to include all contractual transactions between a state and
its citizens,8 and because it allowed Jacksonian jurisprudence to
intrude into constitutional law.'
The Charles River Bridge Case was more about politics than
about political economy. In order to demonstrate this, I first
introduce certain essential aspects of the political and cultural
history of the period. I then discuss the history and historiogra-
phy of the case together, highlighting those aspects of the Court's
opinion on which historians have based the prevailing view of the
significance of the case. The three major difficulties with the
prevailing view of the case are then exposed. My interpretation
follows, together with an epilogue that discusses the significant
uses to which the case was put when cited later by state and
federal courts. What emerged was not a creative act of destruc-
tion of vested rights, intended to unleash the forces of economic
development, but a decision intended to protect community inter-
ests from an excessive and greedy individualism.
The decades of the 1820s and 1830s were shaped by the
mythologized memory of the revolutionary era, and in particular,
by the sense of loss accompanying the passing of the generation
of revolutionary heroes.'" With the passing of the founders, the
succeeding generation was forced to confront the question of
whether the republic could survive without their guidance.1 The
stunning coincidence of the nearly simultaneous deaths of John
Adams and Thomas Jefferson, on July 4, 1826, exactly fifty years
after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, plunged the
young nation into a deep and melancholy sense that it had en-
tered into what George Forgie calls a "post-heroic age," an age
bereft of the strong guiding hands of the founding fathers.12
The founders were memorialized in a large body of hagio-
graphic literature that exhorted the next generation to honor
them and preserve their carefully crafted republic by emulating
their virtuous character."8 The significance of political disagree-
8. See text accompanying notes 94-108.
9. See text accompanying notes 137-72.
10. See generally GEORGE B. FORGIE, PATRICIDE IN THE HOUSE DIVIDED: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF LINCOLN AND HIS AGE (1979).
11. FORGIE, cited at note 10. For discussion of the concerns about the survival
of the republic, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 91-93, 118-24 (1969); and BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 280-301 (1967).
12. FORGIE, cited at note 10, at 51-53. Chancellor Kent summarized this anxi-
ety in the following words, "[niow we sadly realize that we are to be under the
reign of little Men - a pygmy race & that the sages of the last age are extin-
guished." Letter from Chancellor Kent to Justice Story, June 23, 1837, in STORY,
cited at note 1 at 270-71.
13. FORGIE, cited at note 10, at 26-31, 44-45. For a discussion of the tradition
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ment among the founders was elided, and they were presented as
generally unified in character, if not in the particulars of their
political agendas. 4 The tenor of this literature was generally
conservative, and even regressive."
The post-heroic age came last of all to the judiciary. Its found-
ing hero, Chief Justice John Marshall, endured on the bench for
thirty-four years, until his death on July 6, 1835. Even before his
death, Marshall had become a symbol of continuity and conserva-
tism in the law. The hagiography of John Marshall began in 1833
with Story's Commentaries on the Constitution."6 R. Kent
Newmyer has identified this enormous work as Story's effort to
will into existence a national jurisprudence, a centralization and
systemization of the law according to principles agreeable to New
England conservatives. 7 Story's method combined the classical
treatise on the law 8 with an apotheosis of Marshall based upon
his constitutional decisions." As Washington's military and po-
litical genius reflected his character and demanded emulation, so
Marshall's jurisprudential genius reflected his character, and also
demanded emulation by judges and legal scholars." Story hoped
that by perpetuating "the old and settled law" he would help per-
petuate the young and unsettled republic.2'
Marshall's death plunged Story into a deep depression, rooted
both in personal loss and political pessimism.' When President
Andrew Jackson filled the enormous void with the undistin-
guished party man Roger Taney, Story found himself sitting next
to the personification of the post-heroic era of the judiciary.'
of Washington hagiography, see WILLIAM A. BRYAN, GEORGE WASHINGTON IN AMERI-
CAN LITERATURE, 1775-1865, at 86-120 (1952). Chief Justice John Marshall himself
wrote one of the leading biographies of Washington, entitled THE LIFE OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN FORCES, DURING THE WAR
WHICH ESTABLISHED THE INDEPENDENCE OF His COUNTRY, AND FIRST PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES (1926).
14. FORGIE, cited at note 10, at chapter 1.
15. Id.
16. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1833).
17. Newmyer, cited at note 5, at 162, 172-73.
18. For a discussion of the form of the classical legal treatise and Thomas
Jefferson's use of it in his NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787), see ROBERT A.
FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 42-58 (1984).
19. The treatise was dedicated to Marshall.
20. See Justice Joseph Story, Life of Chief Justice Marshall, in 1 AM. L. REV.,
243-301 (1843). Newmyer has demonstrated that the revival of Harvard Law School
in 1829, the year of Andrew Jackson's inauguration, was part of Story's larger effort
to resist the incursion of democratic influences in the law. See Newmyer, cited at
note 5.
21. NEWMYER, cited at note 4, at 158-69, 365.
22. Id. at 196-97. Story's eulogy of Marshall, while highly stylized and elabo-
rate, gives evidence of his sense of personal loss and his political pessimism. Id.
23. See DUNNE, cited at note 4, at ch. 27; R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME
Vol. 33:01
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Story's Whig contemporaries shared his sense that the transition
from the Marshall Court to the Taney Court was momentous and
hazardous.24 The decision in The Charles River Bridge Case,
Taney's first as Chief Justice, served only to increase their fears.
Chancellor James Kent regarded the decision with "disgust," and
wrote to Story that he had "lost [his] confidence and hopes in the
constitutional guardianship and protection of the Supreme
Court."'5 Story's melancholy and Kent's disgust arose from their
sense that the new Court had threatened the security of property
and rejected the "authority of the old settled law," which both
were so deeply engaged in perpetuating.2" Without "the consti-
tutional guardianship and protection of the Supreme Court," the
security of the republic itself fell into doubt. v
Ever on the lookout for important historical junctures, for
those moments when clear choices were made and a course for
the future charted, some historians have seized upon Story's view
that the decision in the case was momentous. They have accepted
Story's perception that the decision marked a sharp discontinuity
which ended the relative stability of the era of the founding he-
roes and the Marshall Court." They have used this perception
of discontinuity to define the boundaries of a new era. However,
they have not seen the change in entirely negative terms, as
Story did. They have seen it as a spark that caused an explosion
of economic expansion and development.29 They have given us a
COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY (1968); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 1-38 (1937); Louis B. Boudin, John Marshall and
Roger B. Taney, 24 GEO. L.J. 864, 887-95 (1936); William L. Ransom, Roger Brooke
Taney: Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1836-1864), 24 GEO.
L.J. 809, 815-16 (1936).
24. WARREN, cited at note 23.
25. Letter from Chancellor James Kent to Justice Joseph Story (June 23,
1837), reprinted in WARREN, cited at note 23, at 29 [hereinafter Kent Letter].
26. Kent Letter, cited at note 25.
27. Warren Dutton, counsel for the Charles River Bridge Proprietors, alluded
to this concern when he argued, "if men were to deal with each other as this act
deals with the plaintiffs, the very frame-work of our civil polity would be broken
down; all confidence would be destroyed; and all sense of security for the rights of
persons and property would be lost." The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) at 454.
28. For a brilliant cultural and psychological history of that perception, see
FORGIE, cited at note 10. For general discussions of the political history of the peri-
od, see SHAW LIVERMORE, JR., THE TWILIGHT OF FEDERALISM: THE DISINTEGRATION
OF THE FEDERALIST PARTY 1815-1830 (1962); RICHARD P. McCoRMICK, THE SECOND
AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM: PARTY FORMATION IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA (1966); ED-
WARD PESSEN, JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SOCIETY, PERSONALITY, AND POLITICS (rev. ed.
1978); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945); GLYNDON G. VAN
DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA, 1828-1848 (1959).
29. KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 155-71; J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CON-
DITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 27-29 (1956).
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historiography of The Charles River Bridge Case which interprets
it as a watershed in law and political economy. It is generally
presented as a choice between two clearly defined, antithetical
courses of action, one based on the "old settled law""0 of James
Kent and Joseph Story, the other based on the chaotic, pro-devel-
opmental instrumentalism of Roger Taney."'
This view of the case depends heavily upon the work of James
Willard Hurst. In fact, the leading monograph on The Charles
River Bridge Case, Stanley Kutler's Privilege and Creative De-
struction: The Charles River Bridge Case,32 can be read as an
extended footnote to Hurst's work, especially Law and the Condi-
tions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States."
Hurst argued that nineteenth century American law was primar-
ily individualistic, instrumental, and pro-developmental, intended
to "protect and promote the release of individual creative ener-
gy."3 4 Hurst characterized nineteenth-century American legal
culture as follows:
We were a people going places in a hurry. Men in that frame of mind are
not likely to be thinking only of the condition of their brakes. Thus, as
we examine further we find that prevailing nineteenth-century attitudes
in fact made private property pre-eminently a dynamic, not a static in-
stitution. Our situation was inappropriate to the growth of a dominant
rentier interest, merely sitting on its possessions. We did not devote the
prime energies of our legal growth to protecting those who sought the
law's shelter simply for what they had; our enthusiasm ran rather to
those who wanted the law's help positively to bring things about.'
Building upon Hurst's analysis, Kutler and others have argued
that the Supreme Court in The Charles River Bridge Case fa-
vored development by destroying the privileges and vested rights
of the old bridge's proprietors, and endorsing the creation of the
new bridge. In their interpretation, this was intended to spark a
great Hurstian release of energy among transportation enterpris-
es. Historians generally see the Court casting an eye forward to
the approaching era of the railroads, and tailoring legal doctrine
30. Kent Letter, cited at note 25.
31. By "instrumentalism" I mean an understanding that the law is not char-
acterized by any necessary internal coherence, but solely, or nearly so, by its func-
tion or effect. J. Willard Hurst captured this understanding when he described
American law in the nineteenth century as "law not so much as it may appear to
philosophers .... [But] law that is formed largely by the imperatives of action."
HURST, cited at note 29, at 5.
32. KUTLER, cited at note 7.
33. HURST, cited at note 29.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id. at 9-10.
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to facilitate their development." Kutler argues that "the ques-
tion of bridges was only a cover for the problems and higher
stakes involving railroad development."37 Both Hurst and Kutler
point to language in Taney's majority opinion in which he explic-
itly discussed the railroads in a manner which suggested sympa-
thy to their legal needs." Taney wrote as follows:
If this court should establish the principles now contended for, what is to
become of the numerous railroads established on the same line of travel
with turnpike companies; and which have rendered the franchises of the
turnpike corporations of no value? Let it once be understood that such
charters carry with them these implied contracts, and give this unknown
and undefined property in a line of travelling, and you will soon find the
old turnpike corporations awakening from their sleep, and calling upon
this court to put down the improvements which have taken their place.
The millions of property which have been invested in railroads and ca-
nals, upon lines of travel which had been before occupied by turnpike
corporations, will be put in jeopardy. We shall be thrown back to the
improvements of the last century, and obliged to stand still until the
claims of the old turnpike corporations shall be satisfied, and they shall
consent to permit these States to avail themselves of the lights of modern
science, and to partake of the benefit of those improvements which are
now adding to the wealth and prosperity, and the convenience and com-
fort, of every other part of the civilized world.39
This passage has carried enormous weight in the historiography
of American law. It has been read as the "true" reason for the
decision in The Charles River Bridge Case." It has also been
read as the classic illustration of Hurst's theory, as an opinion
which dashed the expectations of the old rentier capitalists and
hitched the country's economic hopes to the dynamic capital of
the new railroads.41 Hurst and Kutler have not recognized any
particular jurisprudential coherence in the Court's opinion; they
have not characterized it as the harbinger of any new system or
style of thought. In their view it was simply instrumental.
Kutler's analysis carries a faint echo of Story's perception of
declension, yet he seems to see "creative destruction" as neces-
sary and somehow inevitable."
The difficulty with this view is that it springs, in part, from an
36. Id. at 10; Boudin, cited at note 23.
37. KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 50.
38. HURST, cited at note 29, at 28; KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 93.
39. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 552-53.
40. HURST, cited at note 29, at 28; KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 93-95, 155-61.
41. Henry F. Graff, The Charles River Bridge Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE
SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 71 (John A. Garraty ed., 1987); KUTLER, cited at note 7;
NEWMYER, cited at note 4, at 225; HURST, cited at note 29, at ch. 1.
42. See, e.g., KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 16, 93.
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assumption that Jacksonian jurisprudence was fundamentally
instrumental and developmental, and lacked any other systemat-
ic coherence.4" It springs also from a too ready acceptance of
Taney's dictum concerning railroads as both an accurate assess-
ment of the consequences of vested rights doctrine, and as a
straightforward statement of the basis for the decision.
My analysis demonstrates that the prevailing understanding of
the case is misconceived, because it is based upon a literal under-
standing of the famous dictum, which, far from providing a ratio-
nale ad terrorem for the decision, was intended as a caricature, a
reductio ad absurdum, of a position not seriously advocated be-
fore the Court. I show also that portions of Taney's opinion other
than the famous dictum reveal the true basis of the decision, a
basis more easily recognized in light of recent pathbreaking work
on previously ignored aspects of jurisprudence in the early repub-
lic. Implicit in my critique is a vision of a coherent Jacksonian
jurisprudence, the outlines of which have recently been uncov-
ered by legal historians who have begun to redefine the history of
antebellum law in America."
THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE
The Charles River Bridge was erected in 1785 and 1786, pur-
suant to a charter granted to the bridge proprietors ("Charles
River Bridge Proprietors") by the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts.45 The Charles River Bridge Proprietors were granted cor-
porate status and authorized to raise capital by selling shares in
the corporation. They were to use the money to build a bridge
connecting Boston with Charlestown, at the site of the ferry then
owned by Harvard College." The Charles River Bridge Propri-
etors were granted the privilege of collecting tolls, at rates speci-
fied in the charter, for forty years.47 They stood to profit to the
extent that toll receipts exceeded the cost of constructing and
maintaining the bridge, over the period of the charter.
In 1792, when the legislature chartered a bridge connecting
43. See, e.g., HURST, cited at note 29, at 5.
44. See ROBIN L. EINHORN, PROPERTY RULES: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHICAGO,
1833-1872 (1991); William W. Fisher III, The Law of the Land: An Intellectual His-
tory of American Property Doctrine, 1776-1880 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Harvard University); William J. Novak, Salus Populi: The Roots of Regulation
in America (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University).
45. 1784 Mass. Acts 53; The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at
420; Commonwealth v. County Commissioners, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 342, 345 (1829);
KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 1.
46. 1784 Mass. Acts 53.
47. Id.
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Cambridge and Boston, it extended the duration of the toll privi-
lege on the Charles River Bridge to seventy years, in recognition
of the diminution of tolls which was sure to result from the erec-
tion of the new bridge. 48 The bridge franchise turned out to be
phenomenally profitable, generating as much as thirty thousand
dollars per year in profits. 49 It is thought to have been one of
the most successful business enterprises in American history to
that time.'0
In 1828, as a result of popular agitation for a free bridge, the
legislature chartered a corporation to build a second bridge con-
necting Charlestown with Boston, a scant few yards from the
Charles River Bridge.5' The new Warren Bridge corporation was
to collect tolls only for such time as would be necessary to recoup
the proprietors' (the "Warren Bridge Proprietors") investment,
with interest."2 Ownership of the bridge would then revert to
the state, and passage would be free. The new corporation was
given eminent domain powers and was required to compensate
the owners of any real property taken for construction of the
bridge. 3 Its charter included no provision for compensation for
incorporeal property, such as the Charles River Bridge franchise.
However, it explicitly relieved the Charles River Bridge Propri-
etors of one half of the annuity which they were required to pay
Harvard College for the ferry franchise which had been destroyed
by the construction of the first bridge. The Warren Bridge Propri-
etors were obliged to make up the difference.'
The Charles River Bridge Proprietors filed a bill in equity in
state court, seeking to have the construction of the new bridge
48. 1791 Mass. Acts 62 (enacted March 9, 1792); Proprietors of Charles River
Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, 498 (1829) (Putnam,
J.), afld, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) [hereinafter Charles River Bridge]; Huntington
v. Am. Bank, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 340, 345 (1828).
49. MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
at 130 (1977).
50. HERBERT HOvENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 112
(1991).
51. 1827 Mass. Acts 127. The new bridge was approximately 90 yards from
the old bridge on the Charlestown side, and 300 yards away on the Boston side.
.Graff, cited at note 41, at 77.
52. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 427.
53. 1827 Mass. Acts 127; Charles River Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) at 345.
54. It was not uncommon at the time for charters of later franchises, which
diminished the trade of earlier established competitors, to provide explicitly for com-
pensation for those competitors, often in the form of stock in the later chartered
enterprise. The annuity granted to Harvard College as former owner of the ferry
was an example of this practice. See, e.g., 1830 Maryland Acts 158; 1827 Mass. Acts
127; 1784 Mass. Acts 53; Washington & Baltimore Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R., 23 Md. (10 G. & J.) 259 (1839); Charles River Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.)
at 499 (Putnam, J.).
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enjoined.' The Supreme Judicial Court denied the plaintiffs'
request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the apparent
conflict over legislative grants could not be ruled upon until after
a hearing on the merits, and, in any event, that the plaintiffs
would not suffer irreparable harm by the construction of the new
bridge.
56
When the four-judge court finally addressed the merits of the
case, after the new bridge had been completed, it divided evenly
and no relief was granted.57 The Justices addressed the ques-
tions before them in the familiar discourse of grants, contracts,
and vested rights. Chief Justice Isaac Parker and Justice Samuel
Putnam agreed with the plaintiffs' argument that the charter of
the old bridge implicitly granted an exclusive right to take tolls
from anyone traveling between Charlestown and Boston. Because
the new bridge collected tolls that would otherwise have been
collected by the old bridge, the charter of the new bridge im-
paired the obligation of the old bridge's charter, which all agreed
was a contract between the state and the proprietors of the old
bridge.5" The Warren Bridge charter thereby violated the Con-
tracts Clause of Article I, section 10, of the United States Con-
stitution, and also took the plaintiffs' property without compensa-
tion, in violation of Article 10 of the declaration of rights of the
Massachusetts Constitution.69 The other two justices, Marcus
55. The Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. The Proprietors of Warren
Bridge, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 376, 376 (1828).
56. Charles River Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) at 348.
57. Id. at 530. The Justices delivered their opinions seriatim beginning at page
443.
58. That question had been settled in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Contra Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622,
629 (1853), in which the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the holding in Dartmouth
College on the grounds that it had brought "evil consequences to the community" by
"shielding corporations from responsibility and correction for the abuse of their corpo-
rate franchises." The court held that the charter of the Bank of Toledo was not a
contract, but an act of legislation, and that a unilateral change in the terms of the
tax burden imposed upon it was not a violation of the Contracts Clause of the feder-
al Constitution. Bank of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. at 629.
59. Charles River Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) at 503-05 (Putnam, J.), 524-32
(Parker, C.J.). Article 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion, provides:
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoy-
ment of his life, liberty and property according to standing laws. He is
obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of this protection;
to give his personal service, or an equivalent when necessary: but no part of
the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied
to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of
the people. In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not controllable by
any other laws than those to which their constitutional representative body
have given their consent. And whenever the public exigencies require that the
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Morton and Samuel Wilde, held that plaintiffs had no exclusive
right to tolls from every traveler over the line of travel between
Charlestown and Boston, and therefore the Warren Bridge char-
ter did not take any property belonging to them, nor did it impair
any contractual obligation running to them from the Common-
wealth."0
Plaintiffs then filed a writ of error with the United States
Supreme Court, seeking review under the Contracts Clause of
the United States Constitution.,' Much of the argument was
framed in terms of the Whig jurisprudence of vested rights. 2
The four eminent advocates, Daniel Webster and Warren Dutton
for the Charles River Bridge Proprietors, and Simon Greenleaf
and John Davis for the Warren Bridge Proprietors, debated the
history and legal characteistics of the ferry franchise that had
been displaced by the Charles River Bridge."3 They contended
mightily over the contemporary consequences of the fact that the
charter of the first bridge required its owners to pay an annuity
to Harvard College, the displaced beneficiary of the ferry fran-
chise. They dissected the terms of the bridge charter issued in
1785, and the meaning of the extension granted in 1792. They
delved deeply into ancient English precedent to divine the rule of
construction properly applicable to the charter, and they clashed
over contemporary policy implications of the different rules of-
fered as choices. The courtroom rang with the terms of the law
governing corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, grants by
property of an individual shall be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive
a reasonable compensation therefor.
MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. X.
60. Charles River Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) at 463-64, 477.
61. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 538.
62. By "the Whig jurisprudence of vested rights" I mean the view that the
most important purpose of law was to protect individual property rights from the
depredations of the democratic majority. Jennifer Nedelsky attributes the origin of
this doctrine in American constitutional jurisprudence primarily to James Madison.
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM (1990); Jennifer Nedelsky, The Protection of Property in the Origins and
Development of the Constitution, in To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE CRITICAL
IDEAS OF THE CONSTITUTION 38-72 (Herman Belz et al. eds., 1992). The heirs of
Madison's Federalism in the 1830s were the Whigs, the party with which Story,
Kent, Marshall, and Bushrod Washington identified. Nedelsky, in To FORM A MORE
PERFECT UNION, at 38-72.
63. The arguments of the four advocates are set forth in The Charles River
Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 428-536.
64. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "[alt common law corporeal
hereditaments were physical objects, comprehended under the term land, and were
said to lie in livery, while incorporeal hereditaments existed only in contemplation of
law, were said to lie in grant and were affiliated with chattel interests." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 726 (6th ed. 1990). Franchise rights, such as those claimed by the
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the Crown and others, and common law rules of contract con-
struction.65 The debate was framed largely in terms chosen and
imposed upon the law of the early republic by Chief Justice Mar-
shall, and Justices Washington and Story."
In his first opinion as Chief Justice, Taney ruled that the char-
tering and construction of the new bridge did not violate the
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution.67 In analyz-
ing Taney's opinion, historians have focused their attention large-
ly on the last portion, which purports to set forth a catalogue of
undesirable consequences which would follow from the adoption
of the position advocated by the plaintiffs and by Justice Story.
The prevailing view is that Taney's primary motivation was to
avoid these anti-developmental consequences. Taney is thought
to have feared that turnpike corporations would claim exclusive
rights in a line of travel between two points, and then hold prog-
ress, in the form of railroads serving the same line of travel,
hostage to whatever extortionate demands the turnpikes might
make. 8 Historians have read the famous dictum as evidence
that Taney believed that a victory for the Charles River Bridge
Proprietors would throw the economy "back to the improvements
of the last century," 9 and that his belief was prophetic."
Justice Story's dissent was framed in the discourse of vested
rights. He insisted that the charter of the first bridge was a con-
tract between the Charles River Bridge Proprietors and the state, '
which created by necessary implication the exclusive rights that
the Proprietors asserted.7 Historians have implicitly taken the
position that Story's understanding of prior law was correct, and
that Taney's understanding of its consequences was also cor-
rect.72 In other words, historians have assumed that the
plaintiffs' rights were in fact vested, and that the protection of
those rights would stifle the development of transportation facili-
ties, and hence, economic growth. In their view, Taney's opinion
changed the law in a manner intended to promote economic de-
velopment. 3
Charles River Bridge Proprietors, were incorporeal hereditaments.
65. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 428-536.
66. Newmyer, cited at note 5, at 154.
67. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 552.
68. KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 93.
69. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 553.
70. HURST, cited at note 29, at 28; KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 93-95.
71. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 598 (Story, J., dissent-
ing).
72. See, e.g., HURST, cited at note 29, at 28; KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 93-
101.
73. See text accompanying notes 34-44.
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This selective appropriation of portions of the majority and
dissenting opinions provided historians with their ideas of both
"privilege" and the creativity of the destruction of that privilege.
It was an understandable error for historians who were still
heavily, though indirectly, influenced by Justice Story, and also
deeply beholden to Willard Hurst for their paradigm of nine-
teenth century legal history.74 Their uncritical acceptance of
Taney's dire hypothetical was both an act of filial piety, and an
act of creation of a critical historical discontinuity in which the
future was shaped.
Hurst himself characterized the case as "[t]he classic statement
of policy in favor of freedom for creative change as against un-
yielding protection for existing commitments."7" For Henry F.
Graff, the Charles River Bridge, and the controversy surrounding
it, stood "as an indestructible monument to the dogged struggle
between property rights and human needs.""6 According to R.
Kent Newmyer, "[clapitalism itself was at issue: what it meant
and who would set economic policy."7 Newmyer also argued
that the case represented a clear choice between the stable pro-
tection of earlier investments, on one hand, and the facilitation of
later investments, on the other.7"
In a somewhat more lengthy discussion, Morton Horwitz de-
scribed The Charles River Bridge Case as "the last great contest
in America between two different models of economic develop-
ment," the one based on monopoly, the other based on competi-
tion.79 He has argued that Taney's opinion reflected a broad con-
sensus in opposition to monopoly privilege, a consensus "no lon-
74. Newmyer, cited at note 5, at 154 (arguing that Story's jurisprudence and
the tradition he established at Harvard Law School formed the basis of both the
conservative legal tradition of the Gilded Age and the scholarly tradition in Ameri-
can law). This tradition continues to influence the writing of legal history. HURST,
cited at note 29; see Stephen Diamond, Legal Realism and Historical Method: J.
Willard Hurst and American Legal History, 77 MICH. L. REV. 784 (1979); David H.
Flaherty, An Approach to American History: Willard Hurst as Legal Historian, 14
AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 222 (1970); John P. Frank, American Legal History: The Hurst
Approach, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 395 (1966); Robert W. Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and
the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & Soc. REV.
9 (1975); Harry N. Scheiber, At the Borderland of Law and Economic History: The
Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 744 (1970).
75. HURST, cited at note 29, at 27.
76. Graff, cited at note 41, at 71, 85.
77. NEWMYER, cited at note 4, at 225; see also R. Kent Newmyer, Justice
Joseph Story, The Charles River Bridge Case and the Crisis of Republicanism, 17
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 232-45 (1973).
78. NEWMYER, cited at note 23, at 109.
79. HORWITZ, cited at note 49, at 134.
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ger confined to a portion of the political spectrum," ° which in-
cluded even the retired Chancellor Kent.8 All of this is in ac-
cord with Stanley Kutler's argument that The Charles River
Bridge Case "fashioned a legal doctrine to justify the process of
creative destruction - a continuous process whereby new inven-
tions and enterprises create new goods and services, and...
destroy existing ones, all under the often empty banner of prog-
ress, improvement, and need."82
ANALYSIS OF THE PREVAILING VIEW
Following Taney's dictum, all of these historians framed the
issue in The Charles River Bridge Case as a stark choice between
stagnation and development. On close examination, however,
many of the premises on which this understanding is based must
be rejected as insupportable. As a matter of fact, The Charles
River Bridge Case was not typical of the legal and economic
choices commonly faced by American society in the Jacksonian
era, and the rule advocated by Webster and Story would not have
thrown the country "back to the improvements of the last centu-
ry. 
8 3
My conclusion is based largely upon three crucial facts, which
have previously received insufficient attention. First, historians
have not given adequate consideration to an important issue of
legal process in The Charles River Bridge Case. The United
States Supreme Court was and remains a court of limited juris-
diction, and did not have the entire controversy of The Charles
River Bridge Case before it. Under its own interpretation of sec-
tion 25 of the Judiciary Act of 17 8 9 ' the Court was foreclosed
80. Id. at 138.
81. In fact, Kent viewed the result in The Charles River Bridge Case with
"disgust." See text accompanying note 25.
82. KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 160.
83. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 553.
84. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided:
And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the
highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could
be had . . . where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an
authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant
to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is
in favour of such their validity ...may be re-examined and reversed or af-
firmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error ....
But no other error shall be assigned . . . as a ground of reversal ... than
such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before
mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, trea-
ties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.
1 Stat. 85-87 (1789).
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from any consideration of the issue of eminent domain.85 The
stark choice between privilege and creative destruction depends
upon the absence of a middle ground. That middle ground was
available in the doctrine of eminent domain, which, though ex-
cluded from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, was very much
available to state courts and legislatures. The sharp dilemma the
Court faced was a consequence of its own jurisdictional limita-
tions. It did not reflect any correspondingly sharp choice in the
realm of Jacksonian political economy.
Beyond this historical effect, the Court's limited jurisdiction
had a significant historiographical effect. It structured the case
as a Manichean choice, and gave historians both a critical mo-
ment in time to study, and a way of explaining the widespread
anxiety that the decision seemed to cause. The significance of the
jurisdictional rule has escaped attention in part because practical
aspects of the doctrine of eminent domain have been misunder-
stood. This misunderstanding is perhaps a result of the mistaken
assumption that the cost of compensation in The Charles River
Bridge Case was somehow representative of compensation costs
in a broad range of cases. In fact, the enormous value of the
Charles River Bridge franchise was wildly aberrational, and did
not reflect the low value of other transportation franchises before
the great railroads.86 This fact alone should raise skepticism
about any effort to construct The Charles River Bridge Case as an
epitome of Jacksonian economic conflict.
Secondly, even those historians who have mentioned compen-
sation in their discussions of the case have dismissed it as costly
and impractical, and inconsistent with the law's assumed pro-
developmental instrumentalism. 7 This position is unsound be-
cause it is based upon a serious overestimation of the practical
costs of compensation. In fact, "the improvements of the last
century," as Taney described the turnpikes, were largely worth-
less as property and abandoned as business enterprises by the
time of the Supreme Court's decision.' Because they were near-
ly worthless, the old turnpike corporations would have had a
claim to only minimal compensation. Moreover, many had been
abandoned and had lost their corporate privileges, including the
85. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 519-20; see also Wat-
son v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834); Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243 (1833); Satterlee v. Mathewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 413 (1829); Meade v.
Beale, 16 F. Cas. 1283 (C.C.D. Md. 1850) (No. 9371) (Taney, C.J.); Golden v. Prince,
10 F. Cas. 542 (C.C.D. Va. 1814) (No. 5509) (Washington, J.).
86. See text accompanying notes 121-32.
87. See, e.g., KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 101.
88. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 553.
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right to sue and be sued as corporations8 9 Despite the dire al-
ternative set out in the Chief Justice's dictum, the turnpikes
were not in any state of slumber from which they could be awak-
ened. They were dead. Even if they could have been revived,
their only viable claim would have been for compensation under
state law. In nearly all cases, these claims would have imposed
only a minimal cost.
The third point, which is very closely related to the first two,
arises from the fact that the enormous profits made by the
Charles River Bridge Proprietors were highly unusual. As noted,
the vast majority of transportation franchises, especially turn-
pikes and canals, were unprofitable, or, at best, minimally
profitable.9 As a result, they were not perceived as redistribu-
tions of wealth worthy of Jacksonian wrath. In fact, contemporar-
ies recognized that they provided important benefits to the pub-
lic, but little benefit to their owners.9 The exceptionally profit-
able bridge, recognized initially as a public benefit," came to be
perceived as a tax upon the public, and a tribute exacted from an
increasingly incensed community."
The Court's Jurisdictional Limitations
Compensation for the Charles River Bridge Proprietors, under
the doctrine of eminent domain, escaped careful discussion in the
Court's majority opinion because the majority was unwilling to
extend the Court's jurisdiction to include it.' In his argument
on behalf of the Charles River Bridge, Warren Dutton explicitly
contended that the Contracts Clause was violated when the state
destroyed the franchise without compensation. 5 In effect, he
argued in favor of incorporation of the compensation clause of the
state bill of rights into the federal Contracts Clause. 6 He ar-
89. See Hooker v. Utica & Minden Turnpike Rd. Co., 12 Wend. 371 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1834).
90. See text accompanying notes 121-32.
91. See note 124 and accompanying text.
92. See the original charter of the Charles River Bridge, 1784 Mass. Acts 53.
93. See the arguments of John Davis, on behalf of the Warren Bridge Propri-
etors, The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 474-513, and text accom-
panying notes 150-61.
94. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 429, 471, 509-11.
95. Id. at 457.
96. Dutton did not argue that the state's action violated the takings clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution. That argument had already been
foreclosed. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). In Barron,
the Court had explicitly rejected the argument that the federal bill of rights, and
the Fifth Amendment in particular, could be applied to invalidate an uncompensated
taking by a state government. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250-51. Chief Justice Mar-
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gued as follows:
If property held under a grant from the State is taken, in the exercise
of the eminent domain, provision for compensation is always made in the
act, and in such cases no questions can arise; as the property is taken by
a paramount authority, and paid for. But, if property thus held is taken,
and no compensation is provided, it does give this court jurisdiction;
because this grant is declared to be a contract executed; the rights of the
grantor are said to be forever extinguished, and a covenant implied never
to re-assert them. When, therefore, this property thus held is resumed or
destroyed by the grantor, the obligation of the contract is impaired, the
implied covenant is broken, and the jurisdiction of this court attaches.7
Daniel Webster made a similar argument, denying the Court's
jurisdiction over eminent domain, but making compensation a
crucial element of his Contracts Clause analysis. 8 Webster stat-
ed, on the one hand, "[ilt is admitted [by plaintiffs] that if the
legislature of Massachusetts takes private property for public
use, under the power of eminent domain, this court cannot take
cognisance of the case. " " On the other hand, Webster stated:
The plaintiffs say the act for the erection of Warren Bridge violates
the Constitution of the United States, and that the act takes the property
of the plaintiffs for public use, without making compensation for it. They
rest on their charter.
This presents the question, whether the Constitution of the United
States is violated. There is no other issue made on this record."'
Simon Greenleaf, on behalf of the Warren Bridge Proprietors,
argued that the issue was one of the sovereign honor of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts. Conceding that relief would be
appropriate in the event of a genuine impairment of contract, he
nevertheless insisted that the Supreme Court must otherwise
presume that the state would "pursue, towards its own citizens,
an enlightened and liberal policy."' Absent an impairment of
shall held that the federal constitution applied solely to the federal government,
except insofar as it explicitly applied to the states. Id. at 251. The Fifth Amendment
by its terms did not apply to the states, and, consequently, the Court held that the
amendment conferred no federal jurisdiction over the claim for compensation in that
case. Id.
97. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 457. See Dutton's
summary and conclusion to the same effect. Id. at 461.
98. Id. at 519-20. Webster's arguments are imperfectly preserved because he
failed to provide the reporter of decisions with a text or notes of his argument.
What is set forth in the reported case is the reporter's reconstruction, from his own
notes and memory, of Webster's argument. Id. at 514.
99. Id. at 520.
100. Id. at 519.
101. Id. at 473.
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contract, the Court could inquire no further."2 John Davis, also
counsel for the Warren Bridge Proprietors, raised a more for-
ward-looking concern. He argued that adoption of the plaintiffs'
position on jurisdiction would open the door to so great an expan-
sion of the Court's jurisdiction as would "make this court preside
over the constitution and laws of the States as well as those of
the United States."103
Chief Justice Taney made it clear early in his opinion that he
had no inclination to accept the novel incorporationist doctrine
advocated by Dutton and Webster. °4 Instead, he finessed
Webster's argument and adhered closely to existing jurisdictional
doctrine:
It is very clear that in the form in which this case comes before us -
being a writ of error to a State court - the plaintiffs in claiming under
either of these rights [the ancient ferry or the bridge charter] must place
themselves on the ground of contract, and cannot support themselves
upon the principle that the law [the Warren Bridge charter] divests vest-
ed rights."5
102. In raising this argument, Greenleaf was gesturing toward a longstanding
policy, reflected in the actions of the legislatures of many states, of providing com-
pensation for the effects of state action even when no positive law compelled com-
pensation. The most prominent example of this arose from The Charles River Bridge
Case itself. See note 134.
103. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 511. In a separate
opinion concurring in the result, Justice McLean relied heavily upon this reasoning
in holding that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the issue of compensa-
tion, and that it could not be incorporated into the Contracts Clause. Id. at 554-83
(McLean, J., concurring). Such a rule "would carve out for this court a new juris-
diction, not contemplated by the constitution, and which cannot be safely exercised."
Id. at 583.
104. Id. at 539.
105. Id. at 539. Taney relied primarily upon Justice Washington's opinion in
Satterlee v. Mathewson. Id. (citing Satterlee v. Mathewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380
(1829)). In that case, Satterlee claimed that he had been divested of rights in real
property by a statute adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature. Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) at 411. After holding that the statute did not impair any contractual obligation,
the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to inquire into state actions taken in
violation of Satterlee's vested, but non-contractual, rights. Id. at 413. Absent a viola-
tion of the Contracts Clause, the Court was powerless:
The only question which occurs in this cause, which it is competent to
this Court to decide is, whether the statute . . . is . . . objectionable, on the
ground of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States?
The objection however which was most pressed upon the Court...
was, that the effect of this act was to divest rights which were vested by law
in Satterlee. There is certainly no part of the Constitution of the United
States which applies to a state law of this description; nor are we aware of
any decision of this, or of any Circuit Court, which has condemned such a law
upon this ground; provided its effect be not to impair the obligation of a con-
tract ....
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In essence, Taney and the Court accepted the proposition that
compensation was solely a matter of state law. The question was
not subject to further review under the prevailing construction of
the Constitution and section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
With the case in this procedural posture, only the claim based on
the Contracts Clause, without the compensation issue, was with-
in the Court's jurisdiction."°
The view that the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the
compensation issue in The Charles River Bridge Case was also
shared by Justice McLean, who stated in a separate opinion,
"[blelieving that this court has no jurisdiction in this case, al-
though I am clear that the merits are on the side of the com-
plainants, I am in favor of dismissing the bill for want of juris-
diction."" 7 Only Justices Story and Thompson thought the
Court should extend its jurisdiction by incorporating the compen-
sation requirement into the Contracts Clause. 108
Because the Court held that the Charles River Bridge charter
did not create the rights claimed by the plaintiffs, its disposition
of the jurisdictional issue was not essential to the outcome of the
case. Its self-imposed jurisdictional limitation must therefore be
recognized as serving purposes distinct from the Court's immedi-
ate concerns in The Charles River Bridge Case. In other words,
the Court did not need to limit its jurisdiction in order to destroy
the Charles River Bridge franchise. But the fact that it declined
to expand its jurisdiction served to eliminate the issue of compen-
sation from the case, and created the sharp choice between privi-
lege and creative destruction that historians have mistaken as a
. . . We intend to decide no more than that the statute objected to in
this case is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and that
unless it be so, this Court has no authority, under the twenty-fifth section of
the judiciary act, to re-examine and to reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in the present case.
Id. at 409, 413-14.
Perhaps intending to tweak Justice Story, Taney also relied on Story's
opinion for the Court in Watson v. Mercer, in which the Supreme Court held that it
had no jurisdiction to hear a case in which a party alleged that an uncompensated
taking of real property, pursuant to a state statute, violated the federal constitution.
The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 540 (quoting Watson v. Mercer,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834)).
106. See BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 66-68
(1938) (noting that the issue of eminent domain was not squarely before the Court
until 1848, in West River Bridge v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848)). In West River
Bridge, the Court held that a compensated taking of property by a state, in confor-
mance to its own laws, did not violate the Contracts Clause, Art. I, sec. 10 of the
United States Constitution. West River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 536.
107. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 583.
108. rd. at 638 (Story, J., dissenting). Here Story anticipated to some extent
the rule articulated in West River Bridge.
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reflection of the condition of Jacksonian political economy. By
ignoring a fundamental issue of legal process - those rules that
both empower and restrain the courts - historians have mistak-
en constitutional and jurisdictional limitations for cultural and
economic conditions. The Court's jurisdictional limitations did not
create or reflect the economic, social, or for that matter, legal
choices faced by American society at that time. Compensation
remained a live issue in the state courts, legislatures and local
communities throughout the country.
Eminent Domain and the Measure of Compensation
By 1828, when the Warren Bridge was chartered, the law of
virtually every state permitted expropriation of private property
for public purposes, upon payment of compensation."9 Harry
Scheiber has summarized the basic constitutional concepts con-
cerning eminent domain law, as adopted by the state courts, as
follows:
(1) that the eminent domain power was an inherent attribute of sover-
eignty, so that private property was held subject to takings by the state;
(2) that this power could be legitimately exercised by the state only for a
"public use" or "public purpose"; and (3) that when property was so tak-
en, the injured private owner must be paid a "just" or "fair" compensa-
tion.
110
Taney's famous dictum in The Charles River Bridge Case ap-
peared to reflect two concerns: first, that superseded enterprises
such as turnpikes would obtain injunctions completely and per-
manently barring the construction of new competing enterprises,
and second, that even if turnpike interests could be bought off,
the cost of such compensation would be enormous. Questions
thus are raised concerning the relationship between the issuance
of injunctions and the payment of compensation, and the actual
109. See, e.g., Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 303, 309 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); Parks
v. City of Boston, 32 Mass. 198 (1834); New Jersey R.R. & Transp. Co. v. Suydam,
17 N.J.L. 25 (N.J. 1839); Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns. 385, 388 (N.Y. 1811); Jackson v.
Catlin, 2 Johns. 248, 263 (N.Y. 1807); White River Turnpike Co. v. Vermont Central
R.R., 21 Vt. 590 (1849); Armington v. Town of Barnet, 15 Vt. 745 (1843); JOHN
LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES (1888);
Joseph M. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221
(1931); Arthur Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM.
L. REV. 596 (1942); Harry Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allo-
cation by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232 (1973);
William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553
(1972); Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985); Fisher, cited at note 44.
110. Scheiber, cited at note 74, at 235.
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cost of compensation under the doctrine of eminent domain."'
The damages to be paid for a compensated taking were based
upon the fair market value of the property, reduced by a sum
intended to reflect the somewhat slippery notion that the proper-
ty owner also benefitted from the condemning enterprise's activi-
ties. For example, -in Parks v. City of Boston," Chief Justice
Shaw recognized the measure of damages as: (1) the value of the
property at the time of the taking; plus (2) interest from that day
until the day on which payment is made; plus (3) any damages
beyond the value of the expropriated property, such as the dimi-
nution, if any, of the value of the plaintiffs remaining property;
minus (4) the value of any benefit conferred upon the owner by
virtue of the existence or operation of the condemning corpora-
tion."3 The New Jersey Supreme Court of Judicature similarly
defined value as present market value at the time of the expro-
priation, but noted that the evidence to be received on that issue
must be broad, and include "a multitude of other facts that con-
sistently with law and common sense, might influence the
judgment.""'
111. There is ample evidence of the procedures followed in the various states in
computing the amount of compensation under the doctrine of eminent domain. In
most cases, corporate charters provided procedures for the exercise of the eminent
domain power. Where the condemning corporation and the property owner failed to
reach an agreement on the amount, the first step was to refer the dispute to arbi-
trators chosen by each side, or to a compensation commission established in accor-
dance with the condemning corporation's charter. If either party was aggrieved by
the decision of the arbitrators or commissioners, a jury could be assembled by the
county court or sheriff. The jury would receive evidence from the parties, would in
many cases inspect the property, and would make a de novo valuation of the proper-
ty pursuant to instructions given by the sheriff or court. Jury awards were subject
to limited judicial review, and could be amended or vacated only if patently unrea-
sonable, or if the award was such that it could only have been made upon the ap-
plication of unlawful or erroneous principles. Juries were explicitly authorized to
measure the evidence of value in light of their own general knowledge and expe-
rience. See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Boston, 37 Mass. 159 (1838); Parks v. City of
Boston, 32 Mass. 198 (1834); New Jersey R.R. & Trans. Co. v. Suydam, 17 N.J.L. 25
(N.J. 1839); White River Turnpike v. Vermont Central R.R., 21 Vt. 590 (1849);
Armington v. Town of Barnet, 15 Vt. 745 (1843); ISAAC F. REDFIELD, THE LAW OF
RAILWAYS ch. XI (6th ed. 1888); Tony Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of Eminent
Domain in Early American Economic Development, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1263, 1267-78
(1981).
112. 32 Mass. 198 (1834).
113. Parks, 32 Mass. at 208-09.
114. Suydam, 17 N.J.L. at 48. One of the justices listed the important items of
evidence:
[Alny pressing demand for building lots on account of their scarcity; the high-
est price at which actual sales have been made; sums that have been offered
with a bona fide intent to purchase, though refused by the holders; the prox-
imity of the land to buildings already erected, or to public works, or to the
common marts of business; and a multitude of other facts that consistently
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In the case of a complete taking of a corporate franchise such
as a bridge, turnpike, or canal, the relevant measure of value
appears to have been the fair market value of the outstanding
shares of stock, reduced by some increment which, as a matter of
common sense, would reflect the benefit conferred on the owner
of the condemned property. Daniel Webster argued that the
"property" at stake in The Charles River Bridge Case was, in
effect, the stock in the franchise, which was, by the time of oral
argument, "not worth thirty dollars."" 5 The trading price of cor-
porate shares would reflect the value of the franchise, including
such factors as earnings, if any, capital investment, and the du-
ration of the franchise in cases in which the charter limited cor-
porate longevity. The benefit conferred by the condemnation
would be determined on a case by case basis. Due to the Court's
jurisdictional limitation, however, none of these factors was con-
sidered because value was not at issue in The Charles River
Bridge Case.
The Cost of Compensation
In order to take seriously Chief Justice Taney's statement of
the policy of expansion supposedly underlying the decision, we
must establish the plausibility of the position that a contrary
result would establish precedent that would enable "the improve-
ments of the last century" to hold progress hostage to whatever
extortionate demands they might care to make. In this ad terro-
rem scenario, the right of old turnpikes to enjoin the construction
of competing railroads would be protected by the Contracts
Clause of the federal Constitution. Justice Story recognized this
as preposterous. Under his view, newer enterprises would simply
be required to compensate older, superseded enterprises."'
Story has been criticized for underestimating the economic and
social costs related to the policy of compensation advocated in his
dissent. Stanley Kutler argues that, "Story simply discounted the
potentially staggering social and economic costs to the communi-
ty inherent in a universal application of eminent domain."
17
But the cost of eminent domain presents an empirical question,
to which Kutler has assumed an answer. Perhaps his thinking
has been too strongly influenced by the exorbitant profits enjoyed
with law and common sense, might influence the judgment.
Id.
115. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 518.
116. Id. at 638, 641-46 (Story, J., dissenting).
117. KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 101.
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by the Charles River Bridge Proprietors, and the indisputably
enormous cost of fair compensation for that particular proper-
ty."8 The exorbitant profits generated by the bridge franchise
made fair compensation for its owners economically unfeasible,
and politically impossible in an age in which such massive redis-
tributions of wealth were seen as corrupt."9 Chief Justice Park-
er of the Supreme Judicial Court recognized this political reality
when he wrote, "I think the question of the necessity of indem-
nifying the proprietors of Charles River bridge has been preju-
diced by the well known fact, that the profits of the bridge have
been great beyond the example of any similar institution in this
country."12 Taney's dictum and Story's critics can only be cor-
rect if turnpike and canal franchises also had a substantial mar-
ket value, based on profits. But economic historians have clearly
demonstrated that this was not the case. In fact, the historical
record points unambiguously to precisely the opposite conclusion.
Historians of the early turnpike movement have unanimously
concluded that turnpikes, with very rare exceptions, were unprof-
itable. More importantly for the present analysis, their failure as
investments and commercial enterprises was widely acknowl-
edged by contemporary observers long before turnpikes were
superseded by railroads. 2 ' Philip Taylor notes that there were
two hundred thirty turnpikes in operation in New England dur-
ing the first half of the nineteenth century, but only five or six
returned a reasonable profit.'22 The vast majority of such enter-
118. At the second oral argument before the United States Supreme Court, Mr.
Davis, counsel for the defendants, reported that the value of the bridge and fran-
chise was $500,000. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 474. Daniel
Webster estimated the value of the franchise to be $300,000. Id. at 518.
Henry F. Graff reports that the Charles River Bridge Proprietors valued the
Charles River Bridge at $280,000 in the mid-1820s. Graff, cited at note 41, at 75.
Morton Horwitz reports that the bridge generated approximately $30,000 per year in
profits during the decade prior to the opening of the Warren Bridge. HoRwITz, cited
at note 49. See the comments of Chief Justice Parker of the state court, in text
accompanying note 120.
119. See EINHORN, cited at note 44, for a discussion of redistributions of wealth
by government as a species of corruption.
120. Charles River Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) at 532.
121. See JOSEPH A. DURRENBERGER, TURNPIKES: A STUDY OF THE TOLL ROAD
MOVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES AND MARYLAND 112 (1931); J.L.
RINGWALT, DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 30-32
(1988); GEORGE R. TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 1830-1860, 50-55
(1951); Daniel B. Klein, The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike
Companies of Early America, 28 ECON. INQUIRY 788 (1990); Daniel B. Klein & John
Majewski, Economy, Community, and Law: The Turnpike Movement in New York,
1797-1845, 26 LAW & SocY' REV. 469 (1992); Philip E. Taylor, The Turnpike Era in
New England, ch. V (1934) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University).
122. P. Taylor, cited at note 121, at 266.
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prises faced significant difficulty in raising capital sufficient to
allow them to commence operation. Many were chartered but
never constructed.' s Most turnpikes that actually commenced
business generated toll revenues insufficient to pay for mainte-
nance of the road. The very few which paid any dividends at all
showed a comparatively poor rate of return. 2" An observer of
the turnpike movement in Massachusetts wrote in 1830:
The turnpikes, which were multiplied very rapidly a few years since in
every part of the State, have frequently proved a convenience to the
public; but to their projectors they have generally been unproductive and
very frequently ruinous; the tolls gathered from the travellers being too
inconsiderable to keep the roads in repair and refund to the owners their
original cost."
Investors were quick to recognize that turnpikes were unprofit-
able, and, consequently, the fair market value of shares of stock
in turnpike corporations plummeted. By approximately 1830,
turnpike stock was generally known to be worthless. Philip
Taylor gives two telling examples of this trend:
Shares of the Hartford and Dedham Turnpike sold originally [in 18041 for
$50 per share. Within five years they brought but $10 per share, and by
1825 were worthless .... Original investors in Newburyport and Boston
Turnpike stock paid, in 1803, $1000 per share. Eleven years later, two
shares sold for $63 each. In 1831, a holding of fifty shares was sold for
$525, or $10.50 per share. Ten years later, seven shares of the same
stock brought $4, or $0.57 each.1"a
J. L. Ringwalt offers a similar statement made by a contempo-
rary analyst of turnpike finances in Pennsylvania, who wrote in
1828 that:
The whole surface of the State is traversed with numerous turnpikes,
123. For example, in the decade 1801-1810, Massachusetts chartered 80
turnpikes, of which only 44 were built. Id. at app. I, at 339-40.
124. Id. at 107-08, 112-15. Philip Taylor's data suggests that, of those large
turnpike corporations which managed to pay any dividends during the period of
their operation, the average dividend was approximately 1.5%. Id. at 270-71 (Table
XVII). Many other large turnpike corporations showed expenses in excess of toll
receipts. Id. Smaller turnpikes did slightly better, according to estimates based on
Taylor's data. Id. at 277 (Table XVIII). Of those small turnpikes on which he was
able to obtain data, and which paid dividends, the average return was approximately
3.0%. Id. As with large turnpikes, many small roads paid no dividends, and collected
tolls insufficient to cover expenses. Id. It should be noted that Taylor distinguished
large turnpikes from small on the bases of length and capital investment. Id. at
269. He did not offer a specific formula to explain these categories further. Id.
125. Id. at 266 (quoting CARTER & BROOKS, GEOGRAPHY OF MASSACuUSETTs 186
(1830)).
126. P. Taylor, cited at note 121, at 273.
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which extend their branches to the remotest districts. None of them have
yielded dividends sufficient to remunerate their proprietors. Most of them
have yielded little more than has been expended in their repairs, and
some have yielded tolls not sufficient even for this purpose, and conse-
quently, in some cases, have been abandoned by their propri-
etors .... 127
In addition, Taylor's data show a high rate of turnpike abandon-
ment, a trend which was unmistakable well before Taney wrote
his opinion."
Canals were similarly unprofitable. While a few, such as the
Erie and the Delaware & Raritan, were phenomenally successful,
most were dismal failures as investments. They returned little or
no profit, and frequently required state subsidies in order to
remain in operation."9 Individual examples of financial failure
abound.' All of the available evidence points to the conclusion
that turnpikes and canals were generally not profitable enterpris-
es, and that the fair market value of their stock dropped until
many were virtually worthless. Many were abandoned, and con-
sequently lost their corporate status, and with it, their capacity
to sue.'
To the extent that fair market value was based on profits,
127. RINGWALT, cited at note 121, at 30-31 (quoting George W. Smith) (alter-
ation in original). Both Ringwalt and Durrenberger concluded that turnpike investors
were primarily motivated not by the promise of a return on their capital, but by the
enhancement of commerce and real property values which typically accompanied the
opening of new or more efficient lines of communication. Id.; DURRENBERGER, cited
at note 121, at 104-05, 125-26. More recently, Daniel B. Klein has reached the same
conclusion. See Klein, cited at note 121.
128. P. Taylor, cited at note 121, at app. VIII at 357-60. In Massachusetts,
data is available for 88% of those chartered turnpikes which actually became opera-
tional. Id. Of these, 53% were either partially or completely abandoned before 1837.
Id. In New Hampshire the data are unsatisfactory, but nevertheless indicate a high
incidence of abandonment. Id. Connecticut and Rhode Island turnpikes fared some-
what better. Id.
129. Id. at 50-55.
130. The Middlesex Canal in Massachusetts returned dividends of approximately
0.8% in the decade 1819-1829. P. Taylor, cited at note 121, at 292-95. The
Blackstone Canal, from Providence to the Massachusetts border, was even less suc-
cessful. Id. The New Haven and Farmington Canal was a complete failure from the
start, and was long dead before any competing railroad was built. Id. Harvey Segal's
analysis of canal finances indicates that only those canals which attracted heavy vol-
umes of traffic collected tolls sufficient to cover operating expenses and interest on
capital invested. Harvey H. Segal, Canals and Economic Development, in CANALS
AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 240-41 (Carter Goodrich ed., 1961). The
number of canals which reached this pinnacle of success was quite small. Id. Ac-
cording to Segal's analysis, most canals, judged by these financial criteria, were fail-
ures. Id.
131. See, e.g., Hooker v. Utica & Minden Turnpike Rd. Co., 12 Wend. 371 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1834) (holding that a turnpike corporation that had abandoned its road
thereby lost its right to sue).
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damages for takings of most turnpikes and canals would have
amounted to little or nothing. The social and economic costs of
eminent domain proceedings would not have been "staggering,"
as Kutler characterized them,"2 but would have been quite
manageable, and in most cases minimal. Furthermore, it could
not be expected that these defunct corporations, having lost their
capacity to sue, would suddenly be revived to vex the railroads,
absent a change in the law of abandonment intended to permit
them to do so.
It may be argued, as Morton Horwitz has suggested, that com-
pensation procedures and standards were themselves biased in
favor of new enterprises, and regularly led to unrealistically low
compensation awards.133 This was certainly true in some cases,
most especially The Charles River Bridge Case itself." But that
fact is insufficient to rehabilitate the prevailing view of The
Charles River Bridge Case and its relation to Jacksonian political
economy. More importantly, as Tony Freyer's careful study of
compensation proceedings in Maryland and the Middle Atlantic
states demonstrates, such proceedings frequently led to anti-
132. KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 101.
133. HoRwiTz, cited at note 49, at 63-70.
134. In the case of the Charles River Bridge, the Massachusetts legislature
compensated the Charles River Bridge Proprietors. See KUTLER, cited at note 7, at
115 (noting that, in March, 1841, the legislature offered $25,000 for the old bridge
and franchise). Kutler explains that "[tihe $25,000 did not represent payment for
past damages; instead it merely constituted the state's purchase of the proprietors'
rights to maintain a bridge for the remaining years of their charter." Id. But main-
tenance of the bridge was not a right, it was a burden imposed by law. In fact, the
Charles River Bridge Proprietors were indictable for failure to maintain the bridge,
tolls or no tolls. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 639-40 (1837)
(Story, J., dissenting); see also Kane v. People, 3 Wend. 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829);
State v. Day, 3 Vt. 138 (1830). The bridge was, therefore, a continuing burden on
the Charles River Bridge Proprietors, from which they might eventually seek relief,
not an asset they would seek to preserve. After the decision of the United States
Supreme Court, the Charles River Bridge Proprietors had nothing to sell. Even if
they did have something to sell, there was no reason for the Commonwealth to go
to any expense to buy it. The traffic between Boston and Charlestown was not so
heavy in 1841 as to require two bridges. The legislature could have waited until the
Charles River Bridge Proprietors chose to abandon the old bridge, and could then
have claimed it by default. The $25,000 payment was not a payment for a voluntary
sale. In fact, it was a compensation, however low, for all of the Charles River
Bridge Proprietors' losses.
There is evidence of similar payments even to unsuccessful turnpike corpora-
tions, in a few cases, upon surrender of the road to state or local governments. P.
Taylor, cited at note 121, at 324, 357-60. In Massachusetts, the Braintree and
Weymouth Turnpike, constructed at a cost of $38,250, brought $250 for its surrender
in 1854. Id. The Hartford and Dedham, built for $32,030, brought $190 in 1838. Id.
In Connecticut, the Shetucket Turnpike, built for $11,000, brought $1,375 in 1861.
Id. The Derby, one of the few truly successful turnpikes, was constructed at a cost
of $7,520, and brought $8,000 when it was finally abandoned in 1895. Id.
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developmental results."' 5 Compensation for valuable properties
was occasionally assessed at sums beyond the means of 'the new
entrepreneurs, effectively preventing the new enterprise from
commencing operation. All of this suggests that the paradigm of
conflict between absolute privilege and complete destruction fails
to account for two levels of complexity. The first is simply the
availability of compensation under eminent domain, and the eco-
nomic evidence indicating that compensation costs would, at least
in theory, be low. The second is the highly localized political de-
terminants of compensation awards, which suggest the difficulty,
and perhaps even the futility of generalization. What is certain is
that the prevailing understanding of the case as a clear and
sharp economic choice is unsatisfactory.
What, then, of Taney's famous dictum? Was it a prophecy of
what would have happened had Story's rule prevailed, as many
historians have thought? Probably not. As the discussion above
suggests, the premises are so far from correct, and the specula-
tions so extravagant, that it must be presumed, contrary to
historians' previous belief, that Taney knew better. He must have
known that turnpike franchises were unprofitable, and that their
failure as business enterprises was independent of the establish-
ment of railroads. He must have known that, as a result of the
wholesale abandonment of unprofitable turnpikes and canals,
their corporate franchises were lost, and with them, their right to
sue. He certainly knew that, even if the Court should choose to
protect implied rights, as contended for by Webster and Story,
progress would not be halted, but that states would be forced to
pay compensation for the destruction of those rights, under well
settled principles of state law not properly before the Court in
The Charles River Bridge Case. His apparent assertions to the
contrary could not have been the basis for his decision, and long-
standing assumptions based upon a literal reading of the dictum
must now be rejected as insupportable. The combined extrava-
gance and inaccuracy of the assertions suggest at least the possi-
bility that Taney intended them as a sort of caricature, or reduc-
tia ad absurdum.1 36
135. Freyer, cited at note 111, at 1266.
136. Taney had used this rhetorical gambit before. In Brown v. Maryland, he
argued that his adversary's interpretation of the second clause of Article I, section
10 of the Constitution ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports") would strip the states of all power to regulate the
disposition or sale of imported goods even after their arrival in this country, and
would create a situation in which the importer, immune from all state regulation,
"may offer for sale large quantities of gunpowder in the heart of a city, and thus
endanger the lives of the citizens; he may offer hides, fish, and articles of that de-
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THE RISE OF JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE
The understanding of Jacksonian jurisprudence as purely in-
strumental and developmental has come under attack recently by
young historians who have begun sketching the outlines of a
coherent common law jurisprudence, neither instrumental nor
developmental in its essence."3 ' These historians assert that
common law jurisprudence was based on a notion of an organic
community which was itself a bearer of rights. This notion was
captured in the aphorism salus populi suprema lex est, the wel-
fare of the people is the supreme law."
As William Novak has recently shown, the "police power'
of the states and local communities, left largely unrestricted by
the federal constitution under the Tenth Amendment, provided a
basis for the regulation, and even the destruction of individual
rights, when necessary to the interest of the public. In many
respects this power was plenary, and did not require compensa-
tion as a condition of its legitimacy." ° The police power had
deep roots in traditional common law notions of community
rights and their superior relationship to individual rights. In
Novak's view, the common law was essentially a public law,
based upon solicitude for the good of the whole, and drawn from
a British and European tradition which pre-dated Lockean indi-
vidualism and its embodiment in American constitutional
law."' It found its practical expression in the broad range of
laws enacted to govern such ordinary activities as the use of
streets, wharves, navigable waterways, trades, the sale of food,
the hours of labor, and the safety of workers.42 Novak's work
suggests the pervasive involvement of the community in all as-
scription, in places offensive and inconvenient to the public, and dangerous to the
health of the citizens." Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 427-28 (1827).
The Court fended off Taney's argument by simply denying that such dire conse-
quences would follow from adoption of his adversaries' position. Brown, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) at 444; see Novak, cited at note 44, at 361.
This method of argument appeared elsewhere in The Charles River Bridge
Case. In his opinion concurring in the result, Justice McLean based a portion of his
argument on this absurd premise, "Isluppose the Legislature had authorized the con-
struction of an impassable wall, which encircled the ends of the bridge, so as to
prevent passengers from crossing on it." The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) at 565 (McLean, J., concurring).
137. See note 44.
138. Novak, cited at note 44, at 1-101.
139. Novak is careful to point out that he uses this term in its eighteenth
century sense, borrowing from Blackstone, and defining the term as "the due regu-
lation and domestic order of the kingdom." Id. at 5.
140. Id. at 5-6.
141. See Novak, cited at note 44.
142. Id. at 6-7 (listing many more examples).
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pects of individual activity, and a conception of the community as
an entity with a distinct nature and certain rights and preroga-
tives. The community as entity was represented by, and to some
extent embodied in the government, especially the legislature.
Together, these formed the res publica, the public thing."
Salus populi, as an expression of fundamental notions of com-
munity rights, had its counterpart in the aphorism sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedus, use your own so as not to injure another.
Where salus populi captured the superior prerogative of the com-
munity over the individual, sic utere expressed the individual's
obligation to other individuals.'" These concerns converged in a
strongly felt need to abolish the monopolistic privileges of the
economic elite, and to construct a government that would scrupu-
lously avoid redistributions of wealth, especially redistributions
upward.
1 45
Together, the distinct but related ideas of community interest
and the avoidance of redistributions of wealth upward served as
a counterweight to the rigid Whig conception of property through-
out the antebellum period.'" The uncovering of these elements
of the American legal tradition has forced historians to recognize
that property was not always as effectively protected in antebel-
lum law as had previously been thought, and that there was a
powerful alternative to the tradition of possessive individual-
ism.
14 7
These two key concepts, that the community has rights and
that government facilitated redistributions of wealth upward are
illegitimate, both appear prominently in The Charles River
Bridge Case. A portion of Taney's opinion relies very heavily
upon the idea of community rights and the related idea of legisla-
tive discretion.' In the arguments offered on behalf of the
143. Id. at 130.
144. Id. at 8.
145. EINHORN, cited at note 44. This anti-redistributive impulse was embodied
in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Article 6, which provided, in relevant
part, "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to ob-
tain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the
community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the
public." MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. VI; see also Charles River Bridge,
24 Mass. (7 Pick.) at 358-59.
146. Fisher, cited at note 44. Compare William W. Fisher III, Making Sense of
Madison: Nedelsky on Private Property 18 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 547 (1993) (review-
ing NEDELSKY, cited at note 62) with NEDEISKY, cited at note 62.
147. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE PoLrTIcAL THEORY OF PossEssIvE INDrvrDUALISM
(1960); Fisher, cited at note 44.
148. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 548-50. Many of the
historians who have concurred in the prevailing view of the case have noted the
rhetoric of community rights in the arguments and opinion. But they have mini-
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Warren Bridge, there is a strong anti-redistributive justification
for the new bridge's existence.149 The presence of these ideas in
the argument and opinion, together with the result, suggest that
a distinctly Jacksonian jurisprudence of community rights was
beginning to infiltrate the formerly Whig bastion of the constitu-
tional law, and to challenge the hegemony of Marshall's and
Story's views.
The language of community rights and anti-redistributive
jurisprudence peppered the argument of Massachusetts Senator
John Davis, counsel for the Warren Bridge Proprietors and a
Whig.' After a brief introduction, he described the enormous
scale of the redistribution of wealth wrought by the Charles Riv-
er Bridge:
The value of the property on the part of the plaintiffs has been stated
here to be five hundred thousand dollars. Their bridge, costing originally
about forty-six thousand dollars, has grown into this importance from the
large annual income, having yielded to the proprietors, as the plaintiffs
state, over twelve hundred thousand dollars, and advanced from one
hundred pounds a share, to two thousand dollars.''
This portion of his argument was starkly Jacksonian. The case
presented a conflict "of privilege against public right,"52 be-
tween the beneficiaries of this enormous redistribution of wealth,
on the one hand, and the public, "complaining that they are the
tributaries to this great stock of private wealth," on the oth-
er." And the issue was not one of vested rights, but of legisla-
tive and community sufferance. The Charles River Bridge Pro-
prietors "have been suffered to go on until they have been remu-
nerated in a most princely manner;"" they have been "not only
re-imbursed, but enriched in a manner surpassing all ordinary
acquisitions.""'
The remainder of his argument addressed the issues with
which his adversaries and co-counsel had been concerned. Yet he
returned from time to time to the issue of redistribution. He
characterized the rate at which tolls were taken by the Charles
mized its importance, even to the point of reducing it to a rhetorical ornament. See,
e.g., KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 90-93; NEWMYER, cited at note 4, at 224-26. The
novelty of my argument is my suggestion that the famous dictum concerning rail-
roads was the rhetorical ornament.
149. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 474-514.
150. KUTLER, cited at note 7, at 76.
151. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 474.
152. Id. at 489-90.
153. Id. at 475.
154. Id. at 494.
155. Id. at 499.
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River Bridge as "so liberal, not to say extravagant, that for an
outlay of forty-six thousand dollars, the plaintiffs have received a
return of over one million two hundred thousand dollars ....
[This return has] been paid by a tax upon the public travel."'
Senator Davis rejected the argument that the individual share-
holders suffered by the loss of their interest, noting that they had
"made a vast deal of money" and that "they have reaped too rich
harvests to be great sufferers."'57 He reduced his adversaries'
position to this: that the public shall "pay tribute perpetually; not
to indemnify for the enterprise, but to add to the mass of wealth
already accumulated." 5'
His use of the word "indemnify" is significant here. It suggests
that the tolls were conceptualized not as a guarantee or a proper-
ty right, but that they were simply the means by which the legis-
lature attempted to ensure that public gain would not inflict
private loss. An acceptable indemnity would return the pro-
prietors' investment, with a small profit. The creation of a mass
of wealth was neither intended nor acceptable. In the case of the
Charles River Bridge, the government had, in effect, provided the
Charles River Bridge Proprietors with far more than an indemni-
ty. The return on their investment had crossed some vague
threshold and become a tax upon the public travel. What had
originally been conceived as a public benefit had become primari-
ly a source of revenue for a private corporation, a tax, and an
unjustified tribute assessed against the public interest."9
Davis was careful, at the end of his argument, to distance
himself from the worst caricature of democracy run amuck. He
professed to be "sincerely anxious for the preservation" of rights
of property.'O "I am not, therefore, for laying rude hands upon
them - I am not for tearing away these great barriers of right. I
wish it, therefore, to be distinctly understood that I place our
case within the pale of the law, and invoke no violence in its
aid."'6 '
The Court's opinion in The Charles River Bridge Case appears
to occupy a liminal position between Story's jurisprudence and
156. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 491.
157. Id. at 498.
158. Id. at 499.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 514.
161. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 514. Compare Justice
Story's exasperated assertion, "[mly judgment is formed upon the terms of the grant,
its nature and objects, its design and duties; and, in its interpretation, I seek for no
new principles, but I apply such as are as old as the very rudiments of the common
law." Id. at 647 (Story, J., dissenting).
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the newly recovered Jacksonian jurisprudence. The questions
before the Court were framed largely in the discourse of Whig
jurisprudence, and concerned the vesting and scope of the rights
of the Charles River Bridge Proprietors. Yet the result of the case
advanced the goals of Jacksonian jurisprudence, reversing a
prominent upward redistribution of wealth, channeling resources
back into the larger community, and vindicating community
rights.
Contrary to the prevailing view that the heart of the opinion is
the last portion, which makes reference to the railroads, I believe
that the middle portion of the opinion sets forth the rationale on
which Taney relied, and that the first portion was primarily a
rhetorical device intended to prepare the reader for what fol-
lowed, by establishing an analogy between the creation of the
Charles River Bridge and the creation of the Warren Bridge. The
much-discussed last portion was intended more as a rhetorical
device than as a rationale.
The foundations of Taney's opinion were the distinct but relat-
ed concepts of legislative discretion and community rights. His
concern was more with politics than with political economy. After
summarizing the record, Taney dismissed the argument that
Harvard's ferry rights had been transferred to the proprietors of
the first bridge. They had been destroyed, Taney asserted, as a
matter of legislative discretion, in favor of the Charles River
Bridge. He stated that:
The petition to the Legislature in 1785, on which the charter was grant-
ed, does not suggest an assignment, nor any agreement or consent on the
part of the college; and the petitioners do not appear to have regarded
the wishes of that institution, as by any means necessary to insure their
success. They place their application entirely on considerations of public
interest and public convenience, and the superior advantages of a com-
munication across Charles River by a bridge instead of a ferry. The Leg-
islature, in granting the charter, show, by the language of the law, that
they acted on the principles assumed by the petitioners .... [TIhe Legis-
lature deal with the subject, as if it were one exclusively within their
own power, and as if the ferry right were not to be transferred to the
bridge company, but to be extinguished; and they appear to have acted
on the principle that the State, by virtue of its sovereign powers and
eminent domain, had a right to take away the franchise of the ferry;
because, in their judgment, the public interest and convenience would be
better promoted by a bridge in the same place .... 162
The implication was clear: the Charles River Bridge Proprietors,
having been born of legislative discretion, should not be heard to
162. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 542.
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complain when their demise was similarly ordained.
Taney recognized that the legal issue before the Court was
narrow, and required the Court "to determine, for the first time,
the rules by which public grants are to be construed in this coun-
try."163 The rule he adopted was "that in grants by the public,
nothing passes by implication."" His reasoning was simple and
straightforward. Government and law are established to promote
the common good. Salus populi suprema lex est. Taney recognized
the community as distinct from the state, bearing rights which,
while affected by state action, were not rights belonging to the
state. The community has a right to expect the state to promote
the common good, and to continue to do so. This principle re-
quires that a presumption run against the conclusion that the
legislature has diminished its own power to promote the common
good in the present, by actions it took or agreements it made in
the past. The power to tax..5 and the power to charter internal
improvements were examples of government powers presumed to
be retained for the common good, but both were merely specific
examples of the general principle upon which Taney relied. The
Charles River Bridge Case was no more about railroads than it
was about banks. It was about the public interest:
[W]henever any power of the State is said to be surrendered or dimin-
ished, whether it be the taxing power or any other affecting the public
interest, the same principle applies, and the rule of construction must be
the same .... While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded,
we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that the
happiness and well being of every citizen depends on their faithful pres-
ervation.
The whole community are interested in this inquiry, and they
have a right to require that the power of promoting their comfort and
convenience, and of advancing the public prosperity... shall not be con-
strued to have been surrendered or diminished by the State, unless it
shall appear by plain words that it was intended to be done."
Having settled the general principle, Taney had no need to
turn his attention to the specific context of bridges or transporta-
tion franchises. Simply to state the principle was to resolve the
issue before the Court. His famous dictum concerning the rail-
roads was a rhetorical flourish, an argument from false premises
to absurd conclusions. This rhetorical tactic was not uncom-
163. Id. at 546.
164. Id. (citing U.S. v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832)).
165. See Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).
i66. The Charles River Bridge Case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 548-50.
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mon.8 It served to highlight the obviousness of the point that
had preceded it. That point, based upon the principle of salus
populi, was well-settled and longstanding law. Taney ridiculed
the rule contended for by Mr. Webster and Justice Story with the
caricature set forth in the famous dictum. Historians holding the
prevailing view of the case have mistaken caricature for
prophecy."
Despite the sense of alarm, despair, and disgust that The
Charles River Bridge Case raised in the hearts and minds of
Story, Kent, Webster, and the old Whigs,"69 their views of the
sacrosanct nature of property rights ultimately prevailed in the
last half of the nineteenth century, as both William Novak and R.
Kent Newmyer have observed. 7' The decision in The Charles
River Bridge Case was not a harbinger of a new school of thought
in constitutional law, as Story and Kent had so deeply feared. In
fact, Jacksonian jurisprudence was never worked out in the Su-
preme Court's constitutional decisions. 7' Salus populi remained
for the most part a subtext, a principle toward which the Court
would gesture, but which was largely ineffectual in nineteenth-
century constitutional adjudication."'
LATER USE OF THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
The practical effect of the doctrine articulated in The Charles
River Bridge Case, that nothing passes by implication in public
grants, was hardly the destruction of vested interests or monopo-
lies. Exclusive privileges set forth explicitly in state grants re-
mained enforceable, though subject to compensated takings. In
Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & New Haven R.R., the
167. Certainly it was a case that seemed to lend itself to hyperbole. See Justice
McLean's argument based upon this absurd premise, "[s]uppose the Legislature had
authorized the construction of an impassable wall, which encircled the ends of the
bridge, so as to prevent passengers from crossing on it." Id. at 565 (McLean, J.,
concurring).
168. This is not to suggest that economic development in general, or the devel-
opment of railroads in particular, was unimportant to Taney and other Americans in
this period. The fact that Taney constructed his rhetorical ornament in those partic-
ular terms indicates that they were available to him, and that they had some cur-
rency at the time. This analysis suggests not that development was unimportant in
Jacksonian America, but that it was not the driving force behind the decision in The
Charles Riuer Bridge Case.
169. See notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
170. See Newmyer, cited at note 5, at 154-56, 174; Novak, cited at note 44, at
424-46.
171. NEWMYER, cited at note 23; Boudin, cited at note 23.
172. William Fisher has observed that, over time, the aphorism lost its signif-
icance and is now generally considered "vacuous." Fisher, cited at note 44, at 555.
173. 17 Conn. 40 (1845) [hereinafter Enfield I].
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charter of the plaintiff bridge company included a provision ex-
plicitly stating that no other bridge should be built within a spec-
ified distance of the plaintiff's bridge.'74 Relying on this provi-
sion, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant's construction of
a railroad bridge within the protected area.' After a lengthy
discussion of the case law, including The Charles River Bridge
Case, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held as follows:
[Tihe bridge of the defendants will have a tendency, in some degree, to
divert travel from the plaintiffs' bridge .... Such a fact must impair the
value of the plaintiffs' franchise, and diminish their profits ....
It was also said, that the damage, if any, arises from the better mode
of travel, and therefore, furnishes no cause of complaint. But it does not
lessen the injury to the plaintiffs, that the defendants, or the public,
derive great benefit from it. They may enquire, can this be done at their
expense?
The result is, that the superior court be advised to grant an injunc-
tion.
76
Clearly, then, the exclusive privilege found in the bridge charter
was meaningful and enforceable, provided it was explicitly grant-
ed, even after The Charles River Bridge Case.
One might be tempted to believe, with Kutler and others, that
the injunction granted to protect this exclusive privilege was a
formidable and in some sense unyielding barrier to the progress
represented by the superseding enterprise. The subsequent histo-
ry of the Enfield Bridge Case reveals, to the contrary, that as a
practical matter the exclusive privilege did not provide such
complete protection.'77 After the initial decision in Enfield I, a
committee of "three judicious and disinterested freeholders" was
convened, as required by the railroad's charter, to assess the
damage done to the plaintiff and impose a compensation
award.'78 After hearing both parties, the freeholders determined
that the plaintiff had been damaged in the amount of $350.179
The plaintiffs then refused the defendant's tender of the $350,
claiming that they had a right, based on the decision in Enfield I,
to prevent the defendant's enterprise, not merely to be compen-
sated for the revenues it would divert.8 ' In a subsequent pro-
174. Enfield 1, 17 Conn. at 42.
175. Id. at 43.
176. Id. at 66-67.
177. Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R.R., 17 Conn. 453 (1846)
[hereinafter Enfleld I].
178. Enfield II, 17 Conn. at 456.
179. Id. at 457.
180. Id.
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ceeding, in which the plaintiffs' refusal of defendants' tender of
compensation was brought to its attention, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' position and refused to enjoin construction of the sec-
ond bridge. 8'
In 1854 an exclusive charter privilege was held valid by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In Boston & Lowell
R.R. v. Salem & Lowell R.R.," 2 the Boston & Lowell filed a bill
alleging that the Salem & Lowell and two other railroads had
conspired to provide service between the two termini of plaintiff's
road, in violation of the exclusive privilege explicitly granted in
the plaintiffs charter." The Court, by Chief Justice Shaw, held
that the exclusive privilege was valid and enforceable.1" Shaw
distinguished The Charles River Bridge Case, stating that the Su-
preme Court never "doubted that a state would be bound by a
grant of an exclusive right to a bridge or ferry, made in terms by
the legislature; on the contrary, the validity of such a grant was
implied."188 The defendants' demurrer to the bill was overruled,
and, in February of 1855, the Court issued an injunction forbid-
ding the defendants from providing the disputed service.'" In
accordance with common practice, however, the Legislature re-
sponded the following May by authorizing the three defendant
railroads to provide the disputed service, upon payment of com-
pensation to the Boston & Lowell.'
The result in Boston & Lowell R.R. was consistent with both
The Charles River Bridge Case and the case of West River Bridge
v. Dix,"M in which the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an
exclusive charter privilege, and then permitted it to be taken,
upon compensation, according to a later charter granted to anoth-
er corporation."8 ' The narrow question before the Court was
whether a compensated taking of an exclusive franchise violated
the Contracts Clause."g Relying in part upon The Charles River
Bridge Case, the Court held that it did not.'
181. Id. at 466.
182. 68 Mass. 1 (1854).
183. Boston & Lowell R.R., 68 Mass. at 2.
184. Id. at 38.
185. Id. at 34. See also The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51 (1865)
(upholding an exclusive bridge franchise and declaring null and void the charter of
the superseding bridge).
186. Boston & Lowell R.R., 68 Mass. at 39.
187. Acts of 1855, ch. 386, May 18, 1855; see also Boston & Lowell R.R., 68
Mass. at 42.
188. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
189. West River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 535-36.
190. Id. at 530.
191. Id. at 535-36. Explicit grants of exclusive franchise rights remained en-
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CONCLUSION
The decades of the 1820s and 1830s were shaped by the sense
of loss accompanying the passing of the generation of revolution-
ary heroes, and by anxiety concerning the survival of the republic
without their guidance. 9" This post-heroic age came last to the
judiciary, with Marshall's death in 1835. The political pessimism
that accompanied the ascension of Roger Taney to Marshall's
seat contributed to an exaggerated sense of the importance of his
first decision, in The Charles River Bridge Case. For the surviv-
ing members of the "old race of judges" it was an era of disgust,
melancholy and loss, captured most articulately in the letters of
Kent and Story. 9' Justice Story had expended enormous energy
in the attempt to shape a conservative constitutional jurispru-
dence and invest it with the apparent imprimatur of the Found-
ing Fathers, especially Chief Justice Marshall."M As he and his
allies understood the case, it threatened their conception of re-
publicanism itself, which was based on the security of property
and the "authority of the old settled law." The conservative legal
edifice that they had so carefully crafted was under siege by the
Jacksonian barbarians at the gate. 9 '
Historians have uncritically appropriated this sense of disconti-
nuity and declension, and have vested a small portion of the
opinion with disproportionate importance. They have crafted a
historiography of The Charles River Bridge Case as a choice be-
tween two clearly defined, antithetical courses of action, captured
forceable in the latter part of the nineteenth century. For example, in New Orleans
Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., the Court upheld the exclusive rights of a gas com-
pany as against a later chartered company, stating, in language reminiscent of
Story's dissent in The Charles River Bridge Case:
In order to accomplish what, in its judgment, the public welfare required, the
legislature deemed it necessary that some inducement be offered to private
capitalists to undertake, at their own cost, this work. That inducement was
furnished in the grant of an exclusive privilege .... Without that grant it
was inevitable either that the cost of supplying the city and its people would
have been made, in some form, a charge upon the public, or the public would
have been deprived of ... well-lighted streets.
New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 670 (1885). See New
Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1885) (upholding and enforcing
exclusive franchise granted to water company); Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks
Co., 202 U.S. 453 (1906) (enforcing exclusive franchise granted by city to water com-
pany, against city, which sought to establish its own competing water company).
192. See note 11 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Kent Letter, cited at note 25.
194. NEWMYER, cited at note 4, passim.
195. Kent Letter, cited at note 25.
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brilliantly in the phrase "privilege and creative destruction." '
The case has been constructed as a moment in time in which the
future was created.
Closer examination has revealed that the widely accepted
explanation of the case is misconceived. In fact, jurisdictional
limitations unrelated to Jacksonian political economy shaped the
case in the Supreme Court as a judicial dilemma, without any
corresponding economic dilemma. The jurisdictional exclusion of
the doctrine of eminent domain, and the persistent misunder-
standing of the application of that doctrine in practice, have
contributed to the historiographical misconception of the impor-
tance and meaning of the case.197
The enormous value of the Charles River Bridge franchise was
wildly aberrational in Jacksonian America. That fact alone ought
to suggest a skeptical reaction to any analysis of The Charles
River Bridge Case as an epitome of Jacksonian economic conflict.
The recognition of the Court's jurisdictional limitations, together
with the longstanding conclusions of economic historians concern-
ing the generally low value of transportation franchises, all sug-
gest that The Charles River Bridge Case did not accurately reflect
the economic choices faced by Jacksonian America. Furthermore,
the fact that the Supreme Court and the lower courts did not
hesitate, even after The Charles River Bridge Case, to enforce
exclusive privileges created explicitly in state charters, suggests
that the doctrine announced in the case had little real impact on
economic development, and did little more than shift certain
burdens in the negotiations of future public utility charters from
the states to the entrepreneurs. 9 ' The case was important to
contemporaries because its decision marked the beginning of the
post-heroic age of the judiciary, the arrival of the party man
Taney, and the destruction of an enormously valuable corpora-
tion. Most importantly, it represented the intrusion of Jacksonian
jurisprudence into the realm of constitutional law as Justice
Story had so carefully crafted it. Though he did not live to see it,
Story's views ultimately triumphed in Gilded Age jurispru-
dence.'99
196. See notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
197. See notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
198. See note 191.
199. See note 172 and accompanying text.
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